We consider a model of evolution with mutations as in Kandori et al. (1993) [Kandori, M., Mailath, G.J., Rob, R, 1993. Learning, mutation, and long run equilibria in games.
and Friedman and Mezzetti (2001) , is posed by models where each period, a single agent is randomly sampled to learn. a This way, the model becomes a birth-death process. In this note, we make use of the analytical tractability of such processes to obtain exact results (as opposed to only limit ones) in a model of learning in games. Our purpose is illustrative: the birth-death formalism allows for an elementary but self-contained treatment of the model, thus making possible a presentation in e.g. an advanced undergraduate lecture, while at the same time allowing for an analysis of the dynamics for positive mutation rates.
We consider a population of N :::0: 2 players who are repeatedly randomly matched to play a symmetric, 2 x 2 game with strategy set {A, B} and payoff matrix
A B
We assume a > c, b < d, and a + b < c + d. This game has two strict, symmetric
Nash equilibria given by (A, A) and (B, B), such that equilibrium (B, B) is riskdominant. However, (A, A) could be payoff-dominant if a > d.
There is also a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium (a*, a*) where A is played with probability
d-b
a * = -----::--:-
a-c+d-b
The risk dominance of (B, B) is equivalent to the fact that a* > ~.
The evolution of the population is modelled by a Markov process. The state of population n E {O, I, ... , N I, N} is the number of players currently selecting strategy A. Then the (expected) payoff of a player choosing strategy A or B at state n is given by the expressions
which take into account the fact that a player does not play against himself. b aSee Al6s-Ferrer (2003) for a discussion. This formulation is basically equivalent to a more realistic model where agents receive revision opportunities in continuous time following independent Poisson processes. See Blume (1995, Sec. 3) .
bIf the number of players is odd, there is a probability 11 that a given player is not matched. The expected payoffs then are 7f/(S, n) = N;Vl7f(s, n) + 11k, where k is the defanlt payoff of not being matched. The analysis remains unchanged with this specification. An alternative interpretation yielding payoffs as in the expression above is that they are matched once against every other agent in a round-robin tournament.
We follow Sandholm (1998) and Alas-Ferrer (2003) and assume that players are myopic best-responders.c This decision rule can be summarized as follows:
When playing strategy A, switch to strategy B if 7f(A, n) < 7f(B, n -1).
When playing strategy B, switch to strategy A if 7f(B, n) < 7f(A, n + 1).
It remains to specify players' behavior in the (nongeneric) case of payoff ties. We postulate a fixed probability 17 E [0, 1] 
whenever a* > ~ N~l' Since a* > ~ by risk dominance of (B, B), it follows that, given a fixed game, this latter condition is fulfilled for N large enough. Given a fixed population size, it is fulfilled when (B, B) is significantly risk-dominant, i.e. a* is not too close to ~. In the generic case, payoff ties are not possible. A-players switch to B if and only if n :::; n*, while B-players switch to A if and only if n ;::: n*.
Consider now the following dynamics. Each period, exactly one player is sampled at random (uniformly) from the population and receives the opportunity to revise his strategy. If the current state is n, the probability for an A-player to be selected is n/N, while the corresponding probability for a B-player is (N -n)/N.
With probability l-E, the selected player takes the action prescribed by myopic best reply. With probability 0 < E < ~, he mutates and takes the opposite action.
CThis decision rule is not the one implicitly used by Kandori et al. (1993) . See Sand holm (1998) for details.
d As we will see, this is of no consequence for the analysis. Sandholm (1998) assumes that TJ = 0, which corresponds to a "switch only if strictly better" rule.
Let P ij be the probability of transition from a state i to another state j. Clearly, P ij 0 whenever Ii -jl > 1, i.e. we have a birth-death process. Further,
The invariant distribution p has full support and fulfills the detailed balance condition, e
Define, for convenience, {3 = 1':'0' Then,
Iterating, we obtain, for any 1 ~ n ~ n*,
and for any n * + 1
These computations allow us to obtain the following result.
(1)
Theorem 1. Consider the generic case. Let 0 < E < 1 and N > 2 such that
where (~) = rr7':~ ( ~;/) are the binomial coefficients.
eDiscrete-time birth-death processes are defined as Markov chains such that (i) the state space is either the nonnegative integers or a finite set {O, ... , N}, and (ii) for every state n, the only positive-probability transitions are to states n, n -1, and n + 1, with the last two being strictly positive. The detailed balance condition follows directly from the definition of invariant distribution applied to this particular case. See e.g. Feller (1968, p. 396) .
Proof. (a) follows from (1) and (2) observing that 2:::
consequence of (2). (c) follows from (a) noting that the condition a* > ~ N~l implies n* > ~N.
To show (d), notice that the expression in brackets in (3) Although this result can also be proven with the familiar "mutation-counting" techniques, the direct proof presented here has the advantage of providing the closed-form formula (a) for p(O) when c is strictly positive. Clearly, the best-reply process will spend most of its time at the states 0 and N, where full coordination on the pure-strategy Nash equilibria is achieved. Thus, for c small but positive, the odds ratio p(N)j p(O) gives an approximation for the proportion of time that the system spends on each equilibrium, for c > 0 and finite N. Since risk dominance amounts to a* > ~N, part (b) constitutes an extremely simple summary of the results.
Finally, part (d) observes that, for fixed mutation rates but increasing population, the long-run distribution concentrates its weight in the interior of the state space. This result is natural due to the birth-death nature of the process. Take for instance a state with low n, where the best-reply dynamics points towards n 1. As the population grows but c remains fixed, the probability -N of sampling an A-player, who would then switch to B, becomes smaller than the probability of sampling a B player who then mutates to A, c N ;;n. Hence, the mutation-plusbest-reply dynamics points away from the corners. In a sense, this is the birth-death version of the well-known critique that, in models of learning with mutation, results become less plausible as the population size becomes large. f We proceed now to briefly report on the (analogous) results for the non-generic case. In this case, nA, nB E N and payoff ties occur at states nA and nB. Recall that TJ E [0,1] is the probability of switching from the current strategy if a tie occurs.
Thus, A-players switch to B if n < nA, do not change if n > nA, and randomize if n nA. B-players switch to A if n > nB = nA 1, do not change if n < nB, and randomize if n = nB.
fIn Kandori et al. (1993) , this leads to the observation that the expected time of convergence to the stochastically stable state is extremely long for large population sizes. 
Letting again (3 = (1 -E)/E, iteration of the detailed balance condition yields
,8np(0)(~) for 1 :<:: n:<:: nB
nA nA p(n) = (32nA-n-1p(0)(~) for nA + 1:<:: n:<:: N.
Hence, ties play no role whatsoever. This yields the following analogous equation to (3) To conclude, we make use of (3) and (4) Figure 1 (b) represents the invariant distribution for the same parameter values, fixing E = 0.01. The shape is, of course, as expected, with probability piling up (60%) on state O. This illustrates also that, for fixed values of E and N, full coordination is achieved only part of the time (60% in the particular case represented).
The representation is truncated at the state n = 10; for n ~ 11, we have that p(n) < 3 x 10-12 .
We then perform a first sensitivity illustration in Fig. 1( c rate, a population size of 50 is already "large" and again the dynamics points away from the corners.
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